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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
little or nothing, 15 at least as to the 14th Amendment. Therefore, it is
submitted that but one conclusion can be drawn - that double jeopardy is
no longer a distinguishable element in this area of our federal rights.
Rather, it is a vague concept to be considered in detenining whether the
defendant has been given a "fair trial" as that concept has been developed
in the 14th Amendment.
F. Stewart Elliott

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY OATHS-DUE PROCESS
An Oklahoma statute required that state officers and employees
take a loyalty oath swearing they are not now, and for five years prior to
the taking of the oath have not been members of, or affiliated with,
organizations listed by the United States Attorney General as Communist
front or subversive.1 Plaintiff seeks to enjoin payment of compensation
to school teachers who refused to subscribe. Held, that the statute is an
arbitrary assertion of power and offends due process because it fails to
distinguish between innocent membership and knowing activity in a subversive organization. Wieman v. Updegraff, 73 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
A great majority of the attacks upon state and federal statutes prescribing loyalty oaths have been unsuccessful.2 The courts have held that
these statutes do not infringe upon the freedom guaranteed by the First,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Although the right to free speech
carries with it the corresponding right to be silent, 4 either right may be
denied if its exercise would present a "clear and present danger" that it
15. Meador v. Williams, 117 Mo. 564, 92 S.W. 151 (1906) (four state's witnesses
had been examined but material witness was absent); Pizano v. State, 20 Tex. 139,
54 Am. Rep. 511 (1891) (State's Att'y had not subpoenaed his witness). Contra: State
v.Dove, 222 N.C. 162, 22 S.E.2d 231 (1942) (court ordered mistrial since evidence
desired by state was not presently available .
16. In re Kemnder, 136 U.S. 436 (184,United States v.Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542
(1875); State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894); Article, 35 YALE, L.J. 674
(1926).

1. Oxi.A ST'rAT.lit. 51, §§ 37.1-37,8 (1951).
"1......................................
do
solemnly swear . . . that I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist
Party, the Third Communist International, with any foreign agency, party, organization, association or group whatever which has been officially determined by the
United States Attorney General or other authorized agency to he a communist front
or subversive organization . . . that within the five (5) years immediately preceding
the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of the Communist
Party, the Third Communist International, or of any agency, party, organization,
association .... "
2. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1950); American
Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); l)worken v. Cleveland
Board of Education, 94 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio 1950).
3. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1950); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1949); National Maritime Union v. Herzogg,
78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C, 1948)
4. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

CASES NOTED
will bring about the substantive evils Congress has a right to prevent.5
The danger presented need not threaten the very existence of the government as long as the danger is "substantial" or "relatively serious."03 Where
the legislature has determined that such a danger exists, that determination
is binding on the courts.7 Loyalty oaths have been held not to be bills
of attainder or ex post facto laws.8
Where subscribing to a loyalty oath is made a condition to public
employment the "clear and present danger" formula is not the test of
constitutionality, since courts have held that such employment is a
"privilege" rather than a "property right" which is protected under the
due process clauses.9 Federal and state governments, as employers, have
the right to fix reasonable qualifications for employment' 0 and endeavor
to insure self-protection against forces that would attempt to accomplish
their overthrow by force or violence.1 1 It has been held that statutes
requiring school teachers to take loyalty oaths are valid because, although
a school teacher may have a right to be a communist, lie has no constitutional right to teach in public schools.12 However, where a state constitution provides that a loyalty oath provision contained therein shall be
exclusive, additional oaths enacted by the legislature have been held
invalid. '
5. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (statute making advocation of
overthrow of government by force or violence a crime); American Communications
Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (statute requiring labor union officials
to sign loyalty oath); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); National Maritime
Union v. Herzogg, 78 F. Supp, 146 (D.D.C. 1948).
6. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
But see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Baltimore Radio Show v.
State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, 508 (1949)
7. Citlow v. People of N. Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925); National Maritime Union
v. Herzogg, 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1948). But see Vest Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette. 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357, 374 (1927).
8.American Communications Association v. Ponds. 339 U. S. 382 (1950);
Garner v.Board of Public Works. 341 U. S.716 (1951); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). cert. denied 336 U. S.960 (1949); National Maritime
Union v.IHerzogg, 78 F.Supp. 146 (1).D.C. 1948); Hirschman v. Los Angeles County,
231 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1951); Dworken v.Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N.E.2d 18
(Ohio .1950.
Baey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (l).C.Cir. 1950); joint Anti-Fascist Com9

mittee v. Clerk, 177 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 19491; McAulife v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N. Y. 476,
95 N.E.2d 806 (1950).
10. International Worker's Order v. McGrath. 182 l".2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U. S.838
But ef. Tol(1947); Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948).
man v. Underhill, 229 P.2d 447 (Cal. 1951); Inbrie v. Marsh, 3 N. 1. 578, 71 A.2d
352 (1950).
11. American Communications Association v. Dotds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Thorp
v. Board of Trustees, 6 N. J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951).
12. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 48 (1952) (statute making membership in subversive organizations prima facie evidence of disqualification); Thorp v.
Board of Trustees, 6 N. j. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951); Dworken v. Cleveland Board of
Education, 94 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio 1950).
13. Tolman v. Underhill, 229 P.2d 447 (1951); inbrie v. Marsh, 3 N. 1. 578,
71 A.2d 352 (1950). But cf. Shub v. Simpson, 76 A,2d 332 (Md. 1950) (held not an

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The Supreme Court in recent decisions has voiced the opinion that
membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, with knowledge
of its subversive character is a necessary element which must be implicit
in a loyalty oath, 4 but the instant case is the first in which such an oath
has been held unconstitutional on that basis. Recognizing that membership in subversive organizations may be innocent, the Court held that
constitutional protection does extend to arbitrary and discriminatory
exclusion of public employees.'' The Court reasoned that under the
statute the fact of association, no matter how innocent, determines disloyalty and disqualification, and that the statute is therefore an arbitrary
assertion of power which offends due process.
The writer feels that the instant case has established a requirement
necessary to the practicability of loyalty oaths. Knowing membership in
subversive orgainzations must be made implicit in loyalty oaths so that
members ignorant of the real purpose of such organizations will be protected. It is not clear, under the instant case, whether a constitutional
right to public employment exists, the Court having circumvented the
problem. It is submitted that the decision is possibly a trend toward a
view by the Supreme Court that public employment is "property" within
the meaning of the due process clause.
John L. Remsen
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
Plaintiff claimed privilege against the testimony of the doctor who
had examined her prior to accident. Held, the statute' forbidding doctors
to furnish reports of mental or physical examinations to others does not
create a physician-patient privilege in Florida. Morrison v. Malmquist,
62 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1953).
The patient's privilege against the testimony of his physician did
not exist at common law.2 It is an American statutory innovation origadditional oath since statute made persons who advocate overthrow of government by
force or violence ineligible for public office). Loyalty oaths have been held unconstitutional in isolated cases. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
WVis. 1942) (non-comnmunist oath required of applicants for employment); Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal.2d. 506, 171 P.2d. 885 (1946) (loyalty oath
required for use of school auditorium); Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871) (oath
required as prerequisite to voting).
14. See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 494 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716, 723, 724 (1951); Cerende v. Board of Elections, 341 U. S. 56, 57 (1951).
15. See United Mine Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
1. FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1951).
2. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Ia. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938);
8 WcMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940).

